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Why There Should Be an Independent
Decennial Commission on the Press
Lee C. Bollingert
In 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the Press chaired by
Robert M. Hutchins, published its report entitled "A Free and Re-
sponsible Press."" Sharply criticized by the media when pub-
lished,2 the Hutchins Commission Report (as it has come to be
known) seems to have assumed only minor status within the his-
tory of freedom of the press in this century,' as well as among re-
ports on social problems generally. In this article, I will consider
whether the Hutchins Commission Report deserves a different
fate. Given the media's usually astounding self-preoccupation, the
fact that the Report was about the "press" would lead one to ex-
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of
Chicago Press, 1947) ("Hutchins Report").
2 The Press is Indicted, Editor & Publisher (Mar 29, 1947); Frank Hughes, A Free
Press (Hitler Style) Sought for U.S., Chicago Sun (Mar 28, 1947); Let Freedom Ring True,
Time (Mar 31, 1947); The Shape of Things, Nation 164 (Apr 5, 1947).
' The Supreme Court, for example, has referred to the Hutchins Commission Report
only twice. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 250-51 (1974); Gertz v
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 399, 403 (1974). Compare in this regard, for example, the
Commission on Violence in the late 1960s, or, for an even more dramatic comparison, the
Warren Commission.
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pect news sources to pay great attention to it. On the other hand,
the fact that the Report was highly critical of the press might also
explain its largely negative reception and subsequent neglect. If
that is true, then the Report's lack of influence may symbolize the
power of the press to shape and control the agenda of public de-
bate, and thereby also to shape our collective memory. Ironically,
as we shall see, this was one of the Commission's primary criti-
cisms of the press.
We should be interested, of course, not only in how history has
treated the Hutchins Commission Report, but also in the quality of
its ideas and the validity of its critique of mass media. Perhaps the
Report deserves greater attention than it has achieved, and per-
haps this volume in particular will serve to highlight and revivify
the value of its ideas and recommendations.
A primary theme of this article is that the Report offers us, at
the very least, a useful benchmark against which to compare, and
thereby to throw into sharper relief, how, if at all, our concerns
about the quality of American journalism have changed. In the
end, I believe, that inquiry also provides a basis for considering
whether one of the Report's prominent and most interesting rec-
ommendations-namely, the establishment of a permanent, inde-
pendent, non-governmental commission on the press-was ill-con-
ceived or wise.
I begin by summarizing the Commission's Report and then
turn to offering a contemporary evaluation of its ideas.
I. THE REPORT
The Hutchins Commission Report opens with a general state-
ment of its intent: to study "the role of agencies of mass communi-
cation in the education of the people in public affairs."4 The state-
ment is revealing about the Commission's conception of its
enterprise and of the press. The reference to "agencies of mass
communication" anticipates the Report's pronouncement that soci-
ety in 1947 was in the midst of a communications revolution. This
revolution was the result of a shift, over the course of the last cen-
tury, from numerous small, privately-operated press operations
reaching limited numbers ,of citizens to a few huge, corporate orga-
nizations bent on making profits and counting audiences among
the millions. Equally significant is the reference to the role of these
4 Hutchins Report at vi (cited in note 1).
6 Id at 15.
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agencies of mass communication in the "education" of the public.
The Commission took the high road in assessing the performance
of the press. In this country, the Commission believed, the press
does more than provide information for a fee: it educates.
Finally, the Commission's general statement of purpose is re-
vealing about its limited focus. Its interest was in the "education of
the people in public affairs," and it disclaimed any intention of
dealing "with the interrelationship between the American press
and American culture."6 A broader study, the Commission said,
would have "emphasized the dramatic change by which the agen-
cies of mass communication have become a part of the American
environment, affecting the thought and feeling of every citizen in
every department of his life."7 Describing culture as a "depart-
ment" not integral to the highest understanding of public issues,
the Commission evinced both a broad understanding of the new
effects of mass media and a narrow understanding of the role of
culture in public discourse.
As the Report sets out to gauge the quality of the "American
Press," it provides the reader with a description of an ideal press,
against which actual press performance can be measured. Accord-
ing to the Report, a good press must provide "a truthful, compre-
hensive, and intelligent account of the day's events," a "forum for
the exchange of comment and criticism," a means of "projecting
the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one an-
other," a "method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values
of society," and a "way of reaching every member of the society by
the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press
supplies.""
The Commission then pronounced its virtually unqualified
judgment that American mass media were falling well short of this
standard. Indeed, to the question, "Is the freedom of the press in
danger?", the Commission answered with an emphatic "yes."9 It
recognized that "the agencies of mass communication are only one
of the influences forming American culture and American public
opinion," but "[t]hey are, taken together, . . . probably the most
Id (emphasis added).
Id.
Hutchins Report at 20-21 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1.
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powerful single influence today."1 ° According to the Commission in
1947, that influence was a negative one."
The Report draws on two types of press criticism, although it
does not carefully distinguish between them. The first criticism in-
volved a claim about the press's control over information, ideas,
and access to public debate. The central problem was this: Ad-
vances in communication technology, making possible the ever-in-
creasing accumulation of information about the world, as well as
the reporting of that information to larger and larger audiences,
have created a world in which only large corporate enterprises can
succeed.12 The phenomenon of economies of scale has contributed
to a steady decline in the number of press organizations. In 1947,
the city with a single daily newspaper was the rule rather than the
exception. And unlike the press in the early days of the Republic,
only the press itself had the first-hand experience of distant events
necessary to verify the accuracy of their reports. As a result, the
Commission noted a drastic constriction in the base of the funnel
of information and ideas, so great as to cast into doubt the contin-
ued viability of the principle that truth will more likely emerge
from the conflicting expressions in the "marketplace of ideas" than
falsity."3
Throughout the Report, the Commission repeatedly returns to
the problem of bias within the mass media. The bias with which
the Commission was concerned, however, would exist even if the
mass media operated in a vigorously competitive world. The Com-
mission's major criticism was that the mass media had become
"big business," owned and operated increasingly by "big business-
men" rather than by "professional" journalists. " This fundamental
characteristic of mass media meant several things for the nature of
public discussion of public issues in the press. The point is not, the
Commission said, that advertisers-upon whom the media are
largely dependent for revenue-dictate content.15 Rather, the risk
is that the operators of institutions of mass communication may
turn them into mere profit centers. Sometimes the Commission's
depiction of the problem was anything but subtle: The modern
publisher, wrote the Commission, is a "rich man seeking power and
10 Id at vii.
11 Id at 1. See listing of three reasons that the freedom of the press is in danger.
1 Hutchins Report at 5 (cited in note 1).
11 Id at 13-16.
Id at 59.
Id at 62.
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prestige. He has the country club complex."' This characterization
of the modern publisher presumably meant that, in the Commis-
sion's opinion, the issues raised and the arguments presented
about those issues tend to be those of interest to members of that
particular social class.17 This characterization also meant-and
here the Report is quite explicit-that the press regularly and ac-
tively opposes any legislation that would injure its own interests.18
But the Commission's notions about the commercialization of
public issue discussion in the media transcend these obvious, even
if important, senses of the term "bias." The Commission tries to
get at a more elusive problem: namely, at how the drive for profit
motive overwhelms, or seduces, professional journalistic judgment.
The Report speaks of how the media managers, driven to acquire
wider and wider audiences, create the "news" in ways that will at-
tract attention, even at a cost of significant distortion."0 Thus, the
media avoid presenting material that audiences find unsettling or
disagreeable, thereby satisfying the natural human impulse not to
confront that with which we disagree.20 Moreover, media simply
"transfer[s] to mass communication what had formerly passed
from person to person as gossip, rumor, and oral discussion."" Ac-
cording to the Commission, the "American newspaper is now as
much a medium of entertainment, specialized information, and ad-
vertising as it is of news."22 The Commission observed that "the
word 'news' has come to mean something different from important
new information."23 Drama and sensation, instead of accuracy, are
the standard: "The criteria of interest are recency or firstness,
proximity, combat, human interest, and novelty."2 ' And, again,
"[t]o attract the maximum audience, the press emphasizes the ex-
ceptional rather than the representative, the sensational rather
than the significant." 5 We get "catch headlines" rather than a
"continued story of the life of a people."2 "
10 Hutchins Report at 59-60 (cited in note 1), quoting William Allen White.
'7 Id at 51. At one point the Report asks, rhetorically, whether mass media owners
don't share a "common bias-the bias of the large investor and employer?" Id.
'a Id at 61-62.
19 Hutchins Report at 54-57 (cited in note 1).
20 Id at 57.
" Id at 53.
22 Id.
" Hutchins Report at 54 (cited in note 1).
" Id at 55.
26 Id.
26 Id at 56.
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In the Commission's view, the effect of the profit motive on
the presentation of public issues lies at the root of the problem.
Indeed, this should be expected, the Commission says allusively:
Information and discussion regarding public affairs, car-
ried as a rider on-the omnibus of mass communication,
take on the character of the other passengers and become
subject to the same laws that governed their selection:
such information and discussion must be shaped so that
they will pay their own way by attracting the maximum
audience.
The manner of selling goods now controls the idea of "news":
Sales talk relies heavily on sheer repetition of stimuli,
presents favorable facts only, exaggerates values, and
suggests a romantic world part way between reality and a
materialistic utopia. It does not discuss a product. It
"sells" it.2 8
In contrast, public discussion
[a]t its best ... [is] a two-way process, with listening,
response, and interchange, in which some at least of the
participants are genuinely seeking for answers and feel-
ing their way toward those answers which are supported
by the weight of the evidence.2 9
Unfortunately, according to the Commission, "[m]uch of what
[now] passes for public discussion is sales talk."8
Given this emerging, revolutionary new world, what solutions
did the Commission propose? At the very outset of the Report, the
Commission warns us against feeling a sense of anti-climax when
we turn to the subject of what can be done. Conceding that its
recommendations are not startling, the Commission tries to alche-
mize its failure to say anything novel into a sign of significance,
saying of its truly modest proposals: "The most surprising thing
about them is that nothing more surprising could be proposed."8 "
Then, the Report relies on the modesty of its recommendations as
an argument for why they must be accepted and implemented:
"The Commission finds that these things are all that can properly
17 Hutchins Report at 54 (cited in note 1).
ia Id at 64.
" Id at 64-65.
80 Id at 64.
3' Hutchins Report at viii (cited in note 1).
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be done. It is of the utmost importance, then, that these things
should actually be done .... 31
The concluding chapter to the Report lists thirteen recom-
mendations.33 Not one of the thirteen would significantly change
the law regarding the press. Indeed, the Report throughout dis-
claims any wish to retreat from the prevailing level of constitu-
tional protection for the press. Nevertheless, the Report repeatedly
warns the press that its failure to live up to what the Commission
called the "moral" right of freedom of the press, as distinct from
the "legal" right, was jeopardizing its legal right. Society will not
tolerate forever, the Report concludes darkly, a free press that
abuses its freedom and fails to fulfill its social responsibilities.3 4
Several of the Report's recommendations involve proposals for
self-reform by the press: According to the Commission, the press
needs a meaningful code of ethics. (The Commission found one
such code developed by the American Association of Newspaper
Editors in 1947 to be empty.) Media should "accept the responsi-
bilities of common carriers of information and discussion"35-a
recommendation that harks back to a statement in the Report's
foreword that it is "imperative that the great agencies of mass
communication show hospitality to ideas which their owners do not
share."36 Additionally, the Report recommends that the press fi-
nance new, experimental activities "of high literary, artistic or in-
tellectual quality,"37 strive to serve "minority" tastes,38 and "en-
gage in vigorous mutual criticism."39
As for other institutions in society, the Report approves of
federal regulation of radio and television to insure that they oper-
ate according to the "public interest," as well as state boards of
review for motion pictures.40 It further recommends that the gov-
ernment "facilitate new ventures in the communications indus-
try.""' It asks specifically that libel laws be amended to allow the
injured party to obtain "a retraction or a restatement of the facts
32 Id.
See id at ch 6.
Id at 80.
' Hutchins Report at 92 (cited in note 1).
30 Id at viii.
37 Id at 93.
38 Id.
11 Hutchins Report at 94 (cited in note 1).
, Id at 82-83.
,' Id at 83.
8 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
by the offender or an opportunity to reply"; but it refuses to urge
legal remedies for lying generally by the press.4
Universities have an important role to play, according to the
Commission. To promote "professionalism" within the press, edu-
cational institutions should upgrade schools of journalism, making
them genuine centers of intellectual inquiry and scholarly criticism
rather than merely vocational training programs. Prospective jour-
nalists should receive a liberal education.
Finally, and most importantly, the Report recommends "the
establishment of a new and independent agency to appraise and
report annually upon the performance of the press.' ' The Com-
mission believed that:
[We] cannot turn to government as the representative of
the people as a whole, and we would not do so if we
could. Yet it seems to us clear that some agency which
reflects the ambitions of the American people for its
press should exist for the purpose of comparing the ac-
complishments of the press with the aspirations which
the people have for it.44
An independent commission would do this and "would also edu-
cate the people as to the aspirations which they ought to have for
the press. '4 5 Such an agency should be "independent of govern-
ment and of the press," "created by gifts," and "given a ten-year
trial. '4' The report then lists ten responsibilities for the commis-
sion: "Define workable standards of performance"; try to identify
the drift towards monopolization; engage in "[i]nquiries in areas
where minority groups are excluded from reasonable access"; en-
gage in inquiries "abroad regarding the picture of American life
presented by the American press"; investigate instances of lying;
appraise the tendencies and characteristics of the media; appraise
government action affecting communications; encourage centers of
advanced study and research; encourage "projects which give hope
of meeting the needs of special audiences"; and finally, the Com-
mission urges-without indicating any consciousness of the risks
for its newly conceived institution of falling victim to the very dis-
ease it had diagnosed as afflicting modern mass media-that this
11 Id at 86-87.
" Hutchins Report at 100 (cited in note 1).
" Id.
41 Id at 100-01.
" Id at 101.
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new agency should do all this in such a way as to "attract the wid-
est possible publicity and public discussion on all the foregoing.' ' 7
Such is the final Report of the Commission on Freedom of the
Press.
II SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE HUTCHINS COMMISSION'S
. CLAIMS
To modern ears the Hutchins Commission Report seems fa-
miliar, powerful, and naive. The familiar is its concern over the
phenomenon of concentration of ownership and the concomitant
power of a relatively small group of individuals to control the gates
to public discussion. The risk of monopoly had already been iden-
tified as potentially impairing freedom of speech and the press, at
least by the decade preceding the Hutchins Commission Report.
Indeed, Zechariah Chafee-Hutchins's vice-chairmhn for the Com-
mission-had already written about this problem several years
before.48 For us today, of course, the danger of monopoly remains
an important, and frequently articulated, concern. Many commen-
tators commonly believe, in fact, that the problem is worse now
than in 1947. At least some statistics point in that direction, and
strikingly so. While the total number of daily newspapers in the
country has decreased only slightly since World War II,49 the num-
ber of cities with more than a single daily newspaper has decreased
from 117 (cited by the Commission) to roughly two dozen. With
the development of television, both broadcast and cable, since the
late 1940s, however, it is somewhat harder to say definitively
whether the situation, in terms of concentration of ownership, has
deteriorated or improved. The emergence of chain ownership also
must be analyzed for its impact on reducing diversity within the
media.
Where the Hutchins Commission Report is quite novel and
powerful, however, is in its indictment of the commercialization of
public discussion in the mass media, and especially in its efforts to
grasp the wider effects of a business mentality, as contrasted with
a more "professional journalistic" mentality, in the press. This has
been a subject of some serious writing, particularly in England
4' Hutchins Report at 101-02 (cited in note 1).
48 Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Harvard University Press,
1941).
4 Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press 27 n 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
00 Craig Sanders, Aftermath of the Death of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat: Are Failing
Newspapers Still Worth Preserving?, 33 SLU L Rev 1005, 1015-16 (1989).
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(and continental countries as well), where state control of broad-
casting was (or has been) for many years the norm, and the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a free market alternative are more reg-
ularly and fully debated."' In comparison with contemporary
discussions about the effects of a market economy on the press,
though, the Hutchins Commission Report can also seem quite
sketchy and primitive. It is interesting, for example, that the Re-
port makes no mention of the concern that the different abilities
among citizens to succeed in a free market system for goods and
services will, presumably, deeply affect who will have effective ac-
cess in a for-profit mass communications system. Moreover, even
the Commission's speculations about the psychology of a for-profit
press do not fully capture the range of potential effects. Some com-
mentators, for example, believe that such a system tends to be safe
and non-experimental, and that it overemphasizes the joys of ma-
terialism, which in turn has an insidious connection to an un-
healthy fascination with sex and violence.
Where the Report really begins to fall short of seeing the com-
plexity of its perspective, however, is in its uncritical attitude to-
wards its working assumption that the press is the cause of the
defects it identifies in modern public discussion about public is-
sues. The problems with this premise about causation are several.
It overlooks the possibility that the press may simply be a cog in a
larger social wheel that drives it to address public issues in the way
it does. The journalist may be locked in a social context just as
much as anyone else. To the left, and especially to Marxist-ori-
ented writers about mass media, the press is simply the hand-
maiden of the class structure of which it is a part. To fix a reform-
ist gaze on the press, therefore, to eye it as the cause of our
problems, is not only to ignore the true causes, but to make one-
self-unwittingly or not-an ideological tool of these broader
forces by providing them with easy cover and a scapegoat. 2 One
need not be a Marxist, however, to worry about this kind of misdi-
rected concern. To understand the force of the objection, just con-
sider what might be the consequences of a belief that the media
are the primary cause of racism, or sexism, in American society.
An important variation on this criticism of the Hutchins Com-
mission Report is that the Commission fails to understand the role
played by the public in producing the system to which it (the
Raymond Williams, Communications 104-37 (Penguin Books, 1962).
See, for example, Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form 9-
28, 119-34 (Schocken Books, 1978).
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Commission) so vigorously objects. One possible view of the inade-
quacy of public discussion in the media is that the press is
manipulating an innocent and vulnerable public. Another view,
however, is that the press behaves as it does because the public
asks it to behave that way. If that is true, then any analysis of the
causes of the problem should begin with deficiencies in the minds
of the audience.
It is fairly clear, I think, that the Hutchins Commission under-
stands the public to be a puppet of the press, even though the
Commission does not explicitly say so. When the Report speaks of
the press as an "educator," when it talks about how a democracy
can be sustained only so long as the citizens possess a certain
''mentality," a stable and confident temper-in contrast to being
anxious, suspicious, and gullible,53 and when it speaks of how the
press debases its reporting in order to obtain a "wider" audience,
the implicit assumption of these and other remarks throughout the
Report is that the public is capable of "low wants" and "high
wants" and that the media too often appeal-with unfortunate
success-to the lower sides of human nature. The implicit message
of the Report is that this kind of pandering to the baser interests
of people is destroying the moral character and quality of public
debate.
The Commission's reaction to this state of affairs was, as we
have seen, to seek various means of developing a "professional"
identity within the press, to be created and reinforced by collective
action within the media and by institutional actions and pressures
from outside. Towards the end of the Report, at the point where
the Commission considers remedies, it openly confronts the claim
that the press is simply serving public demand such as it is. To
this idea the Commission answers:
We have weighed the evidence carefully and do not ac-
cept this theory. As the example of many ventures in the
communications industry shows, good practice in the in-
terest of public enlightenment is good business as well.
The agencies of mass communication are not serving
static wants. Year by year they are building and trans-
forming the interests of the public. They have an obliga-
tion to elevate rather than to degrade them. 4
63 Hutchins Report at 12 (cited in note 1).
Id at 91-92.
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And in a most revealing statement-revealing of the Commission's
perception that public demands may be illegitimate and of its fur-
ther belief that when demands are illegitimate they should be ig-
nored-the Commission closes the discussion by noting that "there
are some things which a truly professional man will not do for
money."5It is noteworthy, I think, that the Commission did not explore
this perspective fully. This omission is probably not because they
failed to grasp the implications of what they were saying. Rather, I
suspect, the reason lay in their reluctance to appear elitist or pa-
ternalistic towards the general public. If that is so, then it should
be recognized that a number of unhappy consequences may follow
from that reluctance-one of which, relating to the need for an in-
dependent commission on the press, is discussed later. For now, I
would simply note the following criticisms.
First, one unfortunate effect of the Commission's failure to
pursue this perspective further is that we end up with little under-
standing of the human psychology that may be at the root of the
problem. We have no clear idea of the extent or nature of the drift
towards low tastes; we also have equally little understanding of the
extent to which these tendencies are distributed among groups
within society, including the members of the Commission. The
Commission's attitude that illegitimate public demands should be
ignored may also stimulate resentment among segments of the
public and the press, whom the Commission was trying to per-
suade to change.
That leads to a second criticism: While the Commission's sug-
gestion that the press develop a professional posture and not serve
base preferences is a time-honored and sophisticated move in this
kind of debate, it may be, at least to some extent, a wholly inade-
quate remedy for the problem the Commission thought it had
identified. That the press can alter the preferences of the public
may be granted as plausible to a point. But it must also be granted
as plausible that media leadership alone cannot alter the condi-
tions in which large segments of the public find themselves. The
dulling of the average American mind by the nature of modern
work, or by an unresponsive, overly bureaucratized system of gov-
ernment, may blunt the efforts of even the most imaginative jour-
nalists to entice audiences away from their daily dose of low en-
tertainment and frenzied discussions of public issues. The
65 Id at 92.
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Commission's method of reasoning obscured these potential obsta-
cles to the reforms it sought.
Of course, we might also wonder whether the Commission was
correct in its attack on what it characterized as low-quality public
discussion of public issues in the press. There are problems not
only in identifying the causes of low quality, but also in deciding
what is actually low and, conversely, what is high quality in the
treatment of public issues. The Report manifests a serene confi-
dence in the Commission's ability to know it when it sees it. Yet
throughout the Report, the Commission offers virtually no exam-
ples of what it regarded as fine and what inadequate."6 One does
not have to be a deconstructionist to feel that the Commission's
vague words of criticism and aspiration depend on each reader's
assumptions about what is good and bad in press reporting. It is,
therefore, difficult to know, as it always is,57 whether the Commis-
sion's indictment of the press reflected its own class-based biases,
or perhaps its illegitimate and unjustified wish to represent itself
as the grand trustee of high-quality public discussion.
III. THE WORLD SINCE THE REPORT
Putting aside for the moment these general criticisms of some
of the premises of the Hutchins Commission Report, and taking
the Report on its own terms, we might next consider whether,
since 1947, institutional pressures for a more heightened concern
within the press to serve the public interest-pressures of the kind
the Commission had in mind-have increased or decreased. As we
have seen, the Report called for no particular legal regulations. It
did, however, stress the need for greater self-regulation within the
press and for the development of a sense of professionalism that
would be nurtured and encouraged by journalism schools, universi-
ties, and an independent, permanent commission. What would the
Commission say today if they could look upon the world that fol-
lowed them?
There would appear to have been little, if any, change in the
form of collective self-regulation within the mass media. I know of
only one experiment with the kind of independent press council
the Hutchins Commission had in mind. That was the National
Press Council. Established in 1973 to receive and evaluate com-
plaints against the press, it collapsed in 1984, the victim of benign
For one example of reporting considered inadequate, see id at 56.
" Williams, Communications at 109-16 (cited in note 51).
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neglect by major institutions within the press, such as the New
York Times.5 8 Furthermore, with respect to press codes of ethics,
while there are more today than in 1947, they are, as far as I can
tell, still about as vague and ineffectual as the American Society of
Newspaper Editors' code, a code severely criticized by the
Commission."
It is more difficult to say whether there has been an improve-
ment in the training of journalists. My own hunch, and it is only a
hunch, is that the Commission would not be much more pleased
with what it would see today. Journalism schools, and departments
of communications, report that they are looked down upon by
other parts of academia and even by the working press, and com-
plain that they have not received the support of the press in struc-
turing an appropriate curriculum6 ° Most assuredly, few would con-
tend that journalism schools have approached the educational or
scholarly levels of other professional schools.
One bright spot that should be noted, however, is that there
are today several programs in the country for mid-career journal-
ists to take a sabbatical year exploring the university, such as the
Neiman Fellows program at Harvard, which is exactly what the
Commission recommended. (There are now such programs at
Michigan, Chicago, and Stanford.)
Meanwhile, while neither collective self-regulation by the
press nor educational programs for journalists have apparently im-
proved, the liberty of the press to behave as it would like has been
greatly expanded. A major change since the Hutchins Commission
Report is that the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in
building a foundation of constitutional protections against public
regulation of the media. Beginning with the Court's 1964 decision
in New York Times Co. v Sullivan," the Court has decided case
after case (typically one or two every year) in which the media
have claimed a right to be free of social control. And the success of
the press has been quite stunning-less stunning, it is true, under
the Rehnquist Court than before-but still quite stunning.
Whether you look at the law of defamation, invasion of privacy,
national security, or the freedom to report on and even to attend
58 Jonathan Friendly, National News Council Will Dissolve, NY Times B18 (Mar 23,
1984); Philip Newman, National News Council Folds, UPI (Mar 23, 1984); William A.
Henry III, Journalism Under Fire, Time 76 (Dec 12, 1983).
Hutchins Report at 74-75 (cited in note 1).
'0 Jonathan Friendly, Journalism Educators Debate Strategies, Technology and Ties
to the Media, NY Times A15 (Jan 23, 1984).
a' 376 US 254 (1964).
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trials, the press is far more independent of legal controls today
than it was at the end of the Second World War.2 Moreover, while
it is true that the Hutchins Commission did not call for expanding
legal regulation of the press, it certainly did not call for eliminating
such controls, and yet that is precisely the direction that constitu-
tional law has taken in the intervening half-century.
On first glance, then, one might very well conclude that the
context in which the mass media operate has not improved along
the lines wished for by the Hutchins Commission; indeed, circum-
stances may even have worsened. But a second, more thorough, ex-
amination of the past five decades reveals a more complex picture.
In fact, there have been several highly important changes in the
social system that have created new sources of pressure on the
press to serve a broader "public interest."
The first development is the emergence of television, which, it
is commonly assumed, has by itself revolutionized the character of
modern mass media. At the moment, however, I am not interested
in the revolution wrought by television, but rather in the trail of
public regulation that has pursued its character. Though radio
broadcasts were regulated when the Commission wrote (and, in-
deed, such regulation received the Commission's explicit endorse-
ment), the system of regulation at that time was still in its infancy.
Over the past thirty years, various rules arising out of the statutory
obligations of broadcast media to serve the "public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity"" have been developed, refined, and imple-
mented. The fairness doctrine" (requiring broadcasters and cable
to provide reasonable amounts of balanced coverage of public is-
sues of public importance), the equal time rule" (requiring licen-
sees to offer all candidates for public office the same amount of
airtime they offer to any single candidate), the reasonable access
rule6 6 (requiring licensees to give candidates for federal office rea-
sonable opportunities to purchase airtime)-all these and other,
more general obligations to operate in the public interest, enforced
through a system of renewable licenses-constitute extraordinary
inventions in the realm of public regulation of the mass media. To
cover public issues and candidates, to be fair and balanced in that
, Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 1-23 (cited in note 49).
'3 Communications Act of 1934, Title 3, ch 56, amended by 47 USC §§ 302-303 (1988).
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367, 369 (1969).
'5 Communications Act of 1934, Title 3, ch 56, current version codified at 47 USC § 315
(1988).
"4 Communications Act of 1934, Title 3, ch 56, amended by 47 USC § 312(a)(7) (1988).
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coverage, and to maintain a general goal of serving the public good
were all primary goals of the Hutchins Commission, and they were
substantially realized in the scheme of broadcast regulation.
The significance of this development, however, has not neces-
sarily been limited to shaping the character of broadcasting. This
special system also may have influenced other, technically-unregu-
lated media, specifically, the print media. I cannot here develop
this theme, which I explore in Images of a Free Press,e7 but the
essential idea is that a basic, endemic confusion throughout this
period about the reasons (constitutional as well as policy) that
broadcasting could be regulated, while print could not, created an
unstable environment in which the print media could never, or
rarely ever, be sure that the broadcast regulatory regime would not
be extended to them. I believe there are some good reasons for
thinking that this uncertainty has had an important effect on the
development of the mass media as a whole. And, if that is true,
then the state has had an important role in nurturing a particular
conception of journalistic standards in our society.
Still another significant governmental effort to shape the char-
acter of the mass media is the introduction of a system of public
broadcasting. The Public Broadcasting Act of 196768 launched a
special form of media in this country-a publicly sponsored press
with an explicit, central purpose of elevating the performance of
commercial media by good example. By establishing a role model,
it was thought, the preferences of the public could be raised.69
Here, then, in concrete form, is yet another substantial embodi-
ment of the ideals of the 1947 Report.
Finally, in identifying the forces that have given rise to a pub-
lic, or "professional," conception of the press, which has emerged
in the last half-century, I believe one must acknowledge the Su-
preme Court and the process of constitutional interpretations of
the First Amendment. This may sound strange, especially as I
stressed before how the Court has eliminated most public regula-
tion of mass media. Nonetheless, a dimension of this process of
Supreme Court adjudication, I think, has worked in quite another
direction. For, as the Court has embarked on the task of interpret-
ing the First Amendment, it has also articulated an ideal role of
the press in society-and the role the Court has articulated is
" Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 62-107 (cited in note 49).
'" Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-129, 81 Stat 365 (1967), codified as
amended at 47 USC §§ 390 et seq (1988).
6 Id.
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strikingly similar to the conception in the Hutchins Commission
Report. If the Supreme Court's conception is itself influential, and
I believe a reasonable hypothesis is that it has been and is, then
the role played by the Court (whether deliberate or not) may have
been to accomplish through the expression of an ideal what it re-
fused to permit or require by law.7 0
IV. SOME MODERN ISSUES THE COMMISSION NEVER CONSIDERED
As one tries to understand how the world has changed since
the Hutchins Commission Report, certainly the most significant
development has been the emergence, and perhaps even the domi-
nance, of the technology of television. It is to the Commission's
credit that they seemed conscious of the revolutionary potential of
this then inchoate medium. According to the Commission, the pub-
lic's conception of television does "not altogether reflect the impor-
tance of the invention. Television is not just a better or different
form of radio. It is a combination of radio and motion picture
which adds new dimensions to mass communication. '71 Anticipat-
ing a major theme of some of the high social theorists of modern
media,72 the Commission observed that with television, people all
over the globe "will be permitted the same face-to-face observation
of each other that is now limited to the citizens of small communi-
ties. '7 3 All in all, the Report concluded, we can expect that the
"speed, quantity, and variety of mass communication will continue
to increase," though, it also warned, this will not necessarily "in-
crease mutual understanding." It may, in fact, "give wider cur-
rency to reports which intensify prejudice and hatred."'7'
Television, and its effects on the public mentality, has, how-
ever, become a preoccupation of the past half-century, generating
issues never entertained by the Hutchins Commission. It has
spawned a huge literature of "media studies" that searches for
signs of the human and social transformation presumed to have
occurred. Reviewing this literature, one is struck by a shared sense
of a momentous change in human history, in tone and even to
10 This idea that the Supreme Court's (or legal) characterization of the media has an
effect on the character of the media is explored generally in Bollinger, Images of a Free
Press (cited in note 49), and particularly in Lee C. Bollinger, The End of New York Times
v. Sullivan: Reflections on Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 1992 S Ct Rev 41-46.
"' Hutchins Report at 35 (cited in note 1).
" John Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture (Stanford University Press, 1990);
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964).
Is Hutchins Report at 35 (cited in note 1).
14 Id at 35-36.
18 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
some extent in substance, similar to what was written, primarily in
the nineteenth century, about the transformative effects of the in-
dustrial revolution.
Much of the literature, it must be said, is obscurely written
and dramatically overstated-as if it were the product, rather than
the critique, of the hyped-up media it purports to study. One reads
frequently of how television has altered the "time" and "space"
limitations on our ability to receive information about the world,
yet there is very little analysis or even speculation about what ex-
actly this means for human experience or human nature.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that this area of study has at-
tracted many interesting minds who have raised many important
issues, which any intelligent society would want to consider. There
are intelligent observations about the impact on the human mind
of receiving most of our information and ideas visually. In an es-
say, "After the Book?," 75 published in 1972, for example, George
Steiner argued that the "way of life" connected to serious book
reading, which arose out of a tradition that viewed language as the
preeminent means of understanding and ordering human experi-
ence, is being lost because of new media such as television. To
Steiner it is significant that, in modern culture, "a great part of
humanity now receives its main informational and evocative stim-
uli in the form of images and illustrative signal-codes. ' 76 While the
word remains vital, the way of life associated with it over many
centuries has diminished.
Probably the most commonly raised concern about television,
however, is that it is causing a breakdown in our ability or willing-
ness to distinguish the real from the unreal. This claim now perme-
ates every level of public thought and discussion. We see it in the
daily news. For example, former Vice President Quayle criticized
the television sitcom character Murphy Brown for willingly becom-
ing an unwed mother, prompting many within the press and
outside to mock the Vice President by reminding him that Murphy
Brown is a fictional and not a real person. Murphy Brown then,
" George Steiner, After the Book?, in "On Difficulty" and Other Essays 186 (Oxford
University Press, 1978).
7' Id at 199.
7 See Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from Lack of Family Values, NY
Times Al (May 20, 1992); Excerpts From Vice President's Speech on Cities and Poverty,
NY Times A20 (May 20, 1992); Michael Wines, Views on Single Motherhood are Multiple
at the White House, NY Times Al (May 20, 1992); Bill Carter, CBS is Silent, but Then
There's Next Season, NY Times B16 (May 21, 1992); Editorial, Dan Quayle's Fictitious
World, NY Times A28 (May 22, 1992); Richard L. Berke, In Capital and on Coast, Lines
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to much fanfare, responded in character to a supposed criticism of
her by the former Vice President, thereby strangely reinforcing the
sense that the people portrayed on television are real people living
real lives.
Puzzlement over and fear of the effects of a televised (or in-
creasingly visual) understanding of the world is also a major sub-
ject of contemporary art. Pop artists of the late 1950s and 1960s
explored this theme in their works and it continues to be a perva-
sive idea in the contemporary art world. Here are two quick exam-
ples. In a much celebrated and criticized new opera of a few years
ago called "The Death of Klinghoffer," composed by John Adams
and which addressed Arab-Israeli relations in the context of the
hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of a hos-
tage (Leon Klinghoffer), the live performance was simultaneously
shown on a large video screen at the top of the stage. By making
one continually choose between seeing the "actual" production and
the video displaying a close-up camera view, it raised the issue of
how we experience events (both the actual and the operatic), and
how we would choose to have that experience and for what reasons.
Last summer the Tate Gallery in London had an exhibition of
the works of the well-known contemporary artist Richard Hamil-
ton. One picture, titled "War Games," showed a "home video
center" with a television scene of a simulated battlefield. Toy
tanks were lined up as if to represent relative military strength and
two signs labelled "Iraq" and "Kuwait" divided the desert, with
flags of those and Western countries at various locations. A news-
paper with the headline "the Mother of Battles" was folded above
the VCR. A red liquid, like blood, dripped from the bottom of the
television set. The Tate's exhibit brochure was direct and to the
point, describing the work as the "outcome of Hamilton's monitor-
ing of television broadcasts during the period of the Gulf War of
1991. ' '7' Finding "his subject in the commentaries of the battle
given by Peter Snow with the aid of a model of the theater of war,
Drawn on Quayle, NY Times Al, A8 (May 23, 1992); Bill McKibben, TV or Not TV, NY
Times A21 (May 27, 1992).
Actually I think the criticism is unfair, because it was reasonably clear Quayle was ob-
jecting to the behavior of television characters because they influence and affect social mo-
res. Indeed it might be said of Quayle's critics that, by refusing to acknowledge his criticism
of the effects of media, they were fostering the view that media fiction is socially
unmeaningful.
8 See generally, Arthur C. Danto, Beyond the Brillo Box (Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
1992).
79 Simon Wilson, History, Politics, People 1982-92, Tate Gallery (June 17-Sept 6,
1992).
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known as the 'Sandpit,'" the Tate brochure continued, Hamilton
thought that "the television presentation of the war, particularly
as a game with models, obscured the fact that thousands of Iraqi
conscript troops were dying in their 'sandpit.',s
These contemporary works explore dimensions of this general,
and highly important, question about the potentially debilitating
consequences for the public mind in the seductive illusions of tele-
vision. The concerns create a circle: We regard the imaginary
events of television as real-and perhaps even as more desirable
than non-television "reality"; this, in turn, affects how we con-
struct our actual, real lives-political events, for example, are
"staged" to appear more suitable for television and to meet expec-
tations created by television as to what events should be; and, fi-
nally, actual events are reported and discussed on television as if
they were merely fictional and without serious consequences. The
mind ends up profoundly confused in what it treats or experiences
as real (as actual and not as representative of, or pretending to be,
actual).
The most dramatic and far-reaching theory about what has
happened to the modern mind comes from the postmodern pen of
the French (of course) theorist Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard's the-
sis is that the televised image is an "evil demon" that has com-
pletely corroded the moral character of Western societies.81 The
"image" has succeeded in its immoral conquest, so that now the
image has become real and then disappeared-"in the implosion of
image and reality. '82 The claim, if true, is hardly insignificant. Tel-
evision, Baudrillard says, for example, in its treatment of the Holo-
caust, is a continuation of the Holocaust:
Henceforth, "everyone knows," everyone has trembled
before the extermination-a sure sign that "it" will never
happen again. But in effect what is thus exorcised so
cheaply, at the cost of a few tears, will never recur be-
cause it is presently happening in the very form through
which it is denounced, through the medium of this sup-
posed exorcism: television . . . . They want us to believe
that TV will remove the mortgage of Auschwitz by rais-
ing the collective consciousness, whereas it is the perpet-
so Id.
81 Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images (Power Institute Publications, 1988).
82 Id at 27.
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uation of it in a different guise, under the auspices not of
a site of annihilation but a medium of dissuasion.8 3
In comparison with this realm of criticism of modern mass me-
dia, the Hutchins Commission Report seems strikingly tame.
V. THE WISDOM OF A COMMISSION
The above discussion seems to lead to a realization of the con-
tinued good sense, even wisdom, of the Hutchins Commission pro-
posal for an independent, nongovernmental commission to study
the role of the press in our political and cultural life. Both the con-
tinuity of the problems over the past half-century and the enor-
mously significant changes that have occurred since then suggest
that it would be a pity if society did not continue to build upon the
labors of the Hutchins Commission.
A new commission should not, however, try to do all that the
1947 Report recommended. In particular, it should not view itself
as a body for receiving and investigating particular complaints
about the press. To investigate complaints fully requires either the
power to compel the media to cooperate or media willingness to do
so, neither of which is likely to occur. Apart from the problems of
being an effective investigatory body, however, it must be said that
permanent commissions tend rather quickly to become old and
tired, and, when they do, no one will, or should, pay much atten-
tion to them. There is, moreover, much to be done simply in trying
to be self-reflective about the state of the American press and the
quality of public thought about public issues. The best people are
also more likely to be attracted to such an agenda. My recommen-
dation, therefore, is that a new commission should be called, and
privately financed, only once each decade.
The commission should focus its attention on the following
matters: first, describing (or characterizing) the history and pre-
sent conditions of the American press (for example, the degree of
concentration of ownership); second, describing and evaluating the
sources of various pressures on the media to behave well or badly
(there is a particular need to evaluate the effectiveness of public
regulations of broadcasting, such as the fairness doctrine); and,
third, reviewing and synthesizing, and then offering its considered
judgment on, the ideas, observations, and theories that emerge
from the very substantial body of literature that already exists on
the character of modern mass media. This last-mentioned role for
" Id at 24.
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a commission is particularly important, I think, because much of
the literature-indeed, some of the best-is written in a style and
at a level of analysis that makes it accessible only to the erudite
specialist. A commission could play a very useful role simply in
mediating between this sort of high theory and ordinary public
debate.
This last observation suggests an additional reason why an in-
dependent commission is uniquely valuable in this area of social
life. The First Amendment, as I suggested earlier, plays a highly
complicated role in shaping the character of the press in this coun-
try. But two characteristics of the First Amendment are important
here. The first is that the constitutional principle of freedom of
speech and press operates on a highly idealistic vision of the role of
the press in society. There is a need, therefore, for other institu-
tions to consider the tougher reality. The second is that the First
Amendment has the inevitable effect of removing from legislative
arenas virtually any consideration of proposals to control the press
through law (except with respect to broadcast media). The First
Amendment even contributes to an environment in which discus-
sions about the quality of the media are discouraged; the specter
of censorship is used as a threat to silence criticism of the press,
often inappropriately. In any event, in this area, governmental in-
stitutions are precluded from serving one of their important social
functions, which is to provide a social forum in which the deeper
literature and thought about society are digested and understood
through the crucible of potential legislative action. A commission,
therefore, can consider what public institutions would consider but
for the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
In the end, however, it must be acknowledged that any com-
mission must have a vision of the world. We have seen that the
Hutchins Commission had a vision, even though it glossed over
many important implications of that vision. The Commission be-
lieved that the commercial context in which mass media operate in
this country has a negative influence on their behavior in discuss-
ing public issues. Countervailing pressures were required from in-
stitutions both within and without the press. The aim was to in-
fuse the media with a norm of "professionalism," a concept
borrowed from other areas of social life.
In my view, this was a sound, but dangerously partial, vision.
A commission should recognize that any social and economic sys-
tem affects the voice of its media, for good and for bad. In Europe,
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a state-sponsored and administered system of broadcasting pro-
duces-especially in England-an extraordinarily venturesome and
experimental journalism (there is nothing quite like BBC Radio 3
anywhere), but it also produces at times a cloying, stuffy and dead-
ening programming, which purports to present, falsely, to nearly
everyone, the true "public" voice. Moreover, the problem of getting
the best public discussion requires a more subtle understanding
than the Commission revealed of the centrifugal forces in human
nature-besides commercialism-that draw people away from a
proper interest in the collective well-being of the society. Appreci-
ating both the benefits for the principle of freedom of the press of
a free market system, and the range of complex forces that dimin-
ishes high-quality consideration of public issues, is essential to de-
vising and evaluating the institutions that are supposed to provide
the corrective pressures on the primary system. Will these institu-
tions themselves succumb to the pressures they seek to resist?
(This is a fear, for example, for public broadcasting-that it has
become commercialized; and it ought to be a fear held by the aca-
demic community, which is called upon more and more by the
press to offer its "expertise" in a sentence, in return for a moment
of participation in the culture of fame.) Can the press engage in
collective self-reform and adopt an identity of the "professional,"
and yet retain what may be a highly desirable ethos of the inde-
pendent critic at the margins of society?84
Above all, however, any commission should set an example for
the media and be aware of, and quite explicit about, its own biases,
which the Hutchins Commission was not. Commissions may reflect
the views of only a segment of the society. They may fail to see the
potential for genius in what is assumed to be low culture. And,
ironically, they may tend to speak in Olympian judgments, without
adequate regard for nuance, failing to see complex problems as
complex-which may be, in the end, one of the greatest sins of the
media as well. Who can be completely comfortable about the ques-
tions of causation discussed earlier? Who can listen to claims
about the necessity of separating illusion and reality and not begin
to wonder about the complex and potentially positive role of imag-
ination in shaping the understandings of public questions? More
than anything else, however, an honest commission, in my judg-
ment, must confront the issue not just of the quality of the press
but of the quality of the audience. Media leadership is important,
0' Bollinger, Images of a Free Press ch 3 at 55-59 (cited in note 49).
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but so is public awareness of its own limitations and bad impulses.
A commission itself might exercise leadership by arguing with the
public that the problems raised by a Hutchins Commission are at
least partly theirs to acknowledge and partly theirs to solve.
